NUCLEAR WAR, COLD START, or a CLEAN COUNTERFORCE STRIKE? The India–Pakistan Crisis: A Strategic Analysis

“… mutual Indian and Pakistani suspicions have fueled a nuclear arms race, increased the risk of conflict, and gravely increased the cost of war, if it should occur …. The arms race between India and Pakistan poses perhaps the most probable prospect for future use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.”

—James Woolsey, former CIA Director.¹

“The superpower model of nuclear strategy and deterrence does not seem to be applicable … to India and Pakistan, which have small arsenals and where an active and enduring territorial rivalry is punctuated by repeated crises that openly risk nuclear war.”

—Vipin Narang.²

“PAKISTAN SAYS INTELLIGENCE SUGGESTS INDIAN MILITARY ACTION LIKELY SOON”

—Reuters headline, 30 April 2025.³

That India and Pakistan both have nuclear weapons is “particularly worrisome because of the two countries’ violent history,” as one scholar puts it.⁴ When British India was partitioned into India and Pakistan, between 500,000 and 1 million people died, and an additional 10 to 12 million were resettled. A Catastrophe. This painful memory has kept India and Pakistan thinking of each other as mortal enemies.

India and Pakistan have since fought three or four wars, depending on how you count.⁵ Understandably, this region “has long been one of the most dangerous fault lines in global geopolitics.”⁶ The danger lies not only in the presence of nuclear weapons, but also in the disturbing possibility that the logic of rational deterrence underpinning Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) may not apply.

Under such volatile conditions, any violent incident may trigger nuclear war.

We’ve just had a very violent incident. On April 22, 2025, five jihadi terrorists carried out a brutal mass shooting in Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, killing 26 civilians—mostly Hindu tourists—and injuring 20 others. The jihadis, armed with assault rifles and wearing camouflage, reportedly separated men from women and children, asking victims to recite Islamic verses before executing them at close range. A local Muslim pony operator who attempted to resist the assailants was also killed.

Image credit: Scottish Sun

The so-called Resistance Front (TRF), believed to be linked to Pakistan-based jihadi-terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba, initially claimed responsibility for this attack but later—rather laughably—retracted the statement (We did it! No, wait, we are hearing from the Pakistani government that perhaps we didn’t.). India has accused Pakistan of supporting the attack, leading to heightened tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.

This essay examines the current strategic structure of the India–Pakistan nuclear relationship to help us understand better the geopolitical risks and opportunities for Indian and Pakistani bosses in the present crisis. Critically, I will:

1. explain the historical context;

2. consider the consequences of asymmetry in second-strike capability (India clearly has it; Pakistan not so much);

3. explore how jihadi ideology may undermine deterrence;

4. evaluate the plausibility of the alleged Cold Start Indian military doctrine;

5. analyze the potential rationality behind a preemptive Indian counterforce strike (meaning a strike against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and command & control centers); and

6. examine how recent events may have created a unique—and fleeting—window for India to act.

Introduction: Lashkar e-Taiba in historical context

Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group that just carried out a bloody terrorist attack in India, is a Salafist (‘Wahabbist’) jihadi terrorist group founded in Afghanistan in 1987 with a strong anti-India and pan-Islamist agenda. In the short term, it seeks to wrest the territory of Kashmir from India and join it to Pakistan. In the long term, it wants the establishment of Islamic rule across South Asia—meaning that India should become entirely Muslim, even if that requires killing all non-Muslims in India.

Lashkar-e-Taiba was created with support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), so we must understand what the ISI was itself created to do. For that, we must go back to when colonial British India was partitioned and two self-governing countries—India and Pakistan—came into existence at midnight on 14–15 August 1947.

At this time, under the terms of the Indian Independence Act, princely States in what had been British India regained their sovereignty and were legally empowered to choose their own future: they could accede to India, accede to Pakistan, or attempt to remain independent. Hari Singh, the Hindu Maharaja of the mostly Muslim princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, chose initially to remain independent. So, in October 1947, Pakistani tribal militias—supported by the Pakistani military—invaded Kashmir in an attempt to seize the territory. Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession to India, and Indian troops were flown in immediately to repel the invaders. This became the First Kashmir War between India and Pakistan, which ended in 1949 with a United Nations-brokered ceasefire that left Jammu and Kashmir divided: roughly two-thirds under Indian control, one-third under Pakistani control. The war sowed the seeds of a bitter and unresolved territorial conflict that continues to shape India–Pakistan relations.

The British played a double game in the First Kashmir War. Officially, they claimed to be neutral. But approximately 474 British officers were seconded to the Pakistan Army to solve its shortage of experienced military officers.

One notable figure was Major General Sir Walter Joseph Cawthorn, who served, from 1948 to 1951, as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army. Another was Major William Brown, a British officer commanding the Gilgit Scouts, who led a rebellion against the Maharaja’s governor in Gilgit, facilitating the region’s accession to Pakistan. Additionally, Major Alan Macfarlane Sloan, another British officer, served in the Pakistan Army Engineers and participated in operations during the conflict. Other British officers also served in Pakistan’s military during the conflict. And Cawthorn was instrumental in establishing Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in 1948, modeling it after British intelligence structures.​ The Pakistani ISI has also received significant support and training from the American CIA, the French SDECE, and the Iranian Shah’s SAVAK (a creation of the CIA).⁷

What this entire context suggests is that the Western powers had a policy to destroy India. And since the ISI was born in the context of war with India, it was obviously created to undermine that country. Other elements of historical context likewise support this interpretation. They will be considered in greater detail below.

For now, let us stay focused on what we learn by looking at Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).

In the 1980s, the CIA and Saudi Arabia funneled billions through Pakistan’s ISI to fund jihad against the Soviets. This was part of a more general pro-jihadi US policy that, as we explain in our Iran-Contra series, was begun by Jimmy Carter (Democrat) and continued energetically under Ronald Reagan (Republican).

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IRAN-CONTRA: STILL A MYSTERY. Part 1: Reagan, actor on a world stage.

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With Reagan at the helm, and allied with the CIA, Pakistan cultivated a network of radical madrasas (Islamic schools), training camps, and jihadi groups to serve as ideological and logistical infrastructure to create the mujahideen or Afghan ‘holy warriors.’ These radical jihadists, if the redundancy be allowed, were represented by Reagan to Western audiences as ‘freedom fighters.’

“To watch the courageous Afghan freedom fighters battle modern arsenals with simple hand-held weapons is an inspiration to those who love freedom. Their courage teaches us a great lesson—that there are things in this world worth defending. To the Afghan people, I say on behalf of all Americans that we admire your heroism, your devotion to freedom, and your relentless struggle against your oppressors.”

—Ronald Reagan (21 March 1983)⁸

It was in this context—sustained by Saudi Wahhabi doctrine and CIA/ISI patronage—that Hafiz Muhammad Saeed co-founded Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad in 1986, a group that established training camps in Afghanistan and would later give rise to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Though Saeed himself did not fight in Afghanistan, there is no question that his movement drew from and contributed to the broader jihadist mobilization that American foreign policy helped ignite.

By the 1990s, LeT had evolved into one of the most dangerous Pakistan-based terror groups, primarily targeting India and particularly active in Kashmir. With ideological roots in Salafi jihadism and organizational protection from the Pakistani ISI, LeT grew rapidly.

Why is Pakistan supporting groups like LeT? Officially, Pakistani bosses claim to want the population of Kashmir to choose in a plebiscite where they wish to belong. No such plebiscite, however, would likely please the Pakistani bosses. When the Chatham House think tank conducted a poll in 2010, only 2% of those in Indian-controlled Kashmir wanted to join Pakistan. The remaining 98% were split on whether to stay in India or to become independent (43% are for independence, and 55% prefer to stay in India).⁹

But even if India were to allow a plebiscite and Kashmir were to become independent, we have seen already that Pakistan is not likely to respect Kashmiri independence. Which would then create a problem for India, for if Pakistan were to control Indian-administered Kashmir, especially the Kashmir Valley, this would dramatically worsen India’s defensive posture along its northern frontier.

If Pakistani bosses could respect the effective international border—the so-called ‘line of control’—and cease all support for anti-Indian jihadi terrorism, there would be no conflict in South Asia, but apparently Pakistani bosses want the conflict. And the situation is extremely dangerous because both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons.

According to game theory, nuclear peace requires meeting the conditions of what is called Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), and such conditions are not met in South Asia. Pakistani-supported terrorism against India, therefore, might ignite a nuclear war.

The logic of Mutually Assured Destruction

Game theorist Thomas Schelling famously explained that what kept the nuclear peace between the US and the USSR during the Cold War was Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).¹⁰ This is the condition—which prevailed throughout the better part of the Cold War—in which each adversary possesses sufficient nuclear forces to guarantee the complete destruction of the other even after absorbing a first strike, thus making survival impossible for the attacker as well as the defender. The rational incentive for either side to initiate a nuclear war is thus eliminated.

• Second-strike capability is one major requirement for the deterrent logic of MAD to apply.

We have an in-depth discussion of that here:

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THE UKRAINE WAR. Part 2: Are US bosses mad? Or are they betting on MAD?

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In practical terms, if a State is hit first by a massive nuclear attack, it should retain enough survivable nuclear forces (on submarines, mobile launchers, or hardened silos) to inflict devastating retaliation. Without credible second-strike forces, deterrence collapses, for then one side can eliminate the other’s arsenal in a first strike, which gives it an incentive to attack preemptively, which guarantees nuclear war.

Thus, MAD depends critically on each side’s belief that the opponent can and will retaliate with unacceptable force no matter what. This assurance is what stabilizes nuclear relationships, making a nuclear first strike irrational under standard cost-benefit calculations, which then avoids nuclear war.

Why doesn’t MAD apply in South Asia?

India has developed a credible second-strike capability through a growing nuclear triad: nuclear-capable air, land, and sea-based systems.¹¹ The latter include a still-nascent but expanding submarine-launched ballistic missile force. Experts agree that India enjoys a maturing second-strike capability.

Pakistan is rushing to achieve its own nuclear triad and second-strike capability, but, according to the same experts, it isn’t there yet. Its nuclear forces are heavily land-based, mobile, and dependent on a fragile command and control system. And it still lacks a true sea-based deterrent.¹²

“While Pakistan has converted some of its conventional submarines to carry the submarine-launched Babar- [or Babur]-3 cruise missile, the country lacks nuclear-powered [ballistic] missile submarines (SSBNs), considered crucial for a credible second strike capability.”¹³

One reason that MAD does not apply in South Asia, then, is that we have incomplete second-strike capability.

Does a nuclear No First Use (NFU) policy apply?

India has publicly expressed its adherence to a No First Use (NFU) policy:

“The center-right National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government adopted the no-first-use doctrine when India first publicly tested nuclear weapons at Pokhran in 1998, and all subsequent governments of India have reiterated this pledge.”¹⁴

Official Indian doctrine on nuclear weapons:

“The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.

India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.”¹⁵

Narendra Modi has himself restated this doctrinal commitment.

Some public statements, however, suggest that perhaps this NFU commitment may have been wavering. In other words, perhaps Indian officials are now thinking that certain other kinds of attacks on India—though non-nuclear—might be sufficiently heinous to justify an Indian nuclear response.

“India has long adhered to a nuclear no-first-use policy, even though the policy was weakened by India’s decision to potentially use nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological attacks … Yet amid the 2016 dispute with Pakistan, then-Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar indicated that India should not ‘bind’ itself to that policy … Although the Indian government later explained that the minister’s remarks represented his personal opinion, the debate highlighted the conditions under which India would consider using nuclear weapons.”¹⁶

On the other side of the border, Pakistan does not even pledge NFU; its doctrine contemplates early use of tactical nuclear weapons on its own territory to blunt an Indian conventional advance.

“While Pakistan has compensated for its conventional inferiority by relying on high-quality materiel and operating on interior lines of communication, these features only prevent India from overrunning Pakistan in a relatively short conflict. In a longer conventional conflict, India’s overwhelming aggregate quantitative and qualitative power advantage would likely be decisive. From a security perspective then, Pakistan must therefore take all necessary measures to ensure that any conventional conflict with India is blunted early. The optimal nuclear posture for Pakistan to achieve such an outcome is threatening the first use of nuclear weapons on advancing Indian forces after they have crossed the international border on Pakistani soil. Such a posture would blunt the Indian conventional assault and, critically, would give India little justification for a disproportionate nuclear strike on Pakistan’s strategic centers, since Pakistan would not have targeted India’s cities itself [sic]. In this scenario, Pakistan’s second-strike capabilities would not have to be terribly robust, since even the small threat of a counterstrike could deter India from retaliating. Rather, the onus of the Pakistani posture would be on first-strike capabilities in a limited theater setting in which Pakistan would retain the initiative to escalate the conflict, thus mitigating the numerical and procedural requirements to have a significant survivable second-strike capability.

Pakistan has made it clear that the first use of nuclear weapons is in fact its operational nuclear doctrine. There have been several authoritative statements on the conditions under which Pakistan would envision nuclear use. The most important of these was given by Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, the first head of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) which is responsible for stewarding Pakistan’s nuclear assets. In January 2002, Kidwai gave an oft-cited interview in which he outlined the conditions for Pakistani nuclear use:

‘Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India. In case that deterrence fails, they will be used if:

• (a) India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space threshold);

• (b) India destroys a large part of either its land or air forces (military threshold);

• (c) India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan (economic

  strangling);

• (d) India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large

  scale internal subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabilization).’ ”¹⁷

On both sides, therefore, space has opened to at least consider first use, which creates considerable instability in the deterrence game, and once again contributes to make MAD inapplicable.

Jihadism in Pakistan

A deeper source of instability lies not merely in technological or first-use-policy asymmetries but also in the nature of Pakistani political society. Pakistani bosses seem paranoid. And that seems connected to the increasingly suffocating influence of jihadism in Pakistan.

“Pakistan was born an insecure state in 1947, and it remains so to date. To the east, Pakistan continues to reject the Line of Control cutting through Kashmir as its international border with India. Pakistan views its eastern neighbor, India, as an eternal foe that not only seeks to dominate Pakistan but also to destroy it if and when the opportunity arises. In its quest to manage its external security perceptions, Pakistan has pursued guerilla warfare, proxy warfare, terrorism, low-intensity conflict, and full-scale wars with India. To coerce India to make some concession to Pakistan on the disposition of Kashmir, Pakistan has supported an array of Islamist militant proxies [jihadi terrorists—FGW] that operate in Kashmir and throughout India (Ganguly 2001). Despite Pakistan’s varied exertions to wrest Kashmir through force or coercion, India has not budged. In fact, its position has hardened. India long ago abandoned the proposition that the people of Kashmir should ratify their inclusion within India through an internationally monitored plebiscite. The official policy of the Indian government now is that there will be no more changes to India’s international borders.

Even though Pakistan has failed to make even modest progress toward attaining Kashmir, Pakistan’s revisionist goals toward India have actually increased rather than retracted in scope. Since the early 1970s, Pakistan has sought to resist, or possibly outright retard, India’s inevitable if uneven ascendance both in the region and beyond. Despite the fact that India decisively defeated Pakistan in the 1971 war, with half of Pakistan’s territory and population lost when East Pakistan became Bangladesh, Pakistan continues to view itself as India’s peer competitor and demands that it be treated as such by the United States and others. In fact, former president and army chief Pervez Musharraf boldly declared that India must accept Pakistan as an equal as a precondition for peace (Daily Times 2006). Pakistan’s conflict with India cannot be reduced simply to resolving the Kashmir dispute. Its problems with India are much more capacious than the territorial conflict over Kashmir.”¹⁸

As this scholar comments, the pro-jihadi policies of Pakistani military leaders are of special concern.

“Over time, the Pakistan Army and its leadership have engaged in a number of active efforts to Islamize the force.

(…)

the Pakistan Army’s embrace of Islam as Pakistan’s ideology, and of its own role of defending both ideological and territorial frontiers, is not solely the product of the Zia regime or of the US- and Pakistan-led jihad in Afghanistan. In fact, Pakistan and the army embraced these concepts far earlier. Given the numerous references to jihad and Islamic warfare in Pakistan’s professional journals, it would be easy for an untrained reader to assume that the Pakistan Army is a jihadi army.”¹⁹

To some extent, according to this author, the Pakistani military support jihadism for instrumental reasons. But then she offers the following clarification:

“The story, however, does not and cannot end there. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the army has sustained steady infiltration by Islamist militants. Military elites may well have a complex understanding of the multiple purposes Islam serves, but it is far from clear how ordinary officers, much less the enlisted ranks, interpret these incessant references to Islamism, jihad, and perpetual enmity with India, especially when they coexist with some six decades of explicit mobilization of Islamist militants [jihadi terrorists—FGW] under the banner of Islam.”²⁰

In fact, the Pakistani military has had a dedicated policy to create anti-Indian jihadi terror groups. Just recently this was made very clear when the French magazine Spectacle du Monde documented that the Pakistani military was entirely involved in the creation, arming, and training of the anti-Indian terror group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), creating a vast complex “with dormitories, religious education centres, and even solar-powered self-sufficient systems, [which] serve as hubs for terrorists’ indoctrination and training.” According to Spectacle du Monde, JeM has two centers in the Bahawalpur area: Markaz Subhan Allah and the Usman-o-Ali mosque. “The first is a 60,000-square-meter site. It includes a centre for Quranic studies, a sports hall, dormitories, and around fifty rooms” and provides extremist religious education and physical training to about 600 to 700 terrorists. “The report underscores JeM’s historic connections to Pakistan’s intelligence agency, ISI, which allegedly facilitated its activities against India.”

“Former Pakistani officials, including ex-President Pervez Musharraf, have admitted to supporting JeM during their tenures. Such revelations underscore systemic ties between Pakistan’s state apparatus and extremist networks.”²¹

All of this should worry us because:

• Rational, survival-based, self-interested decision-making is another major requirement for the deterrent logic of MAD to apply.

Given that Pakistan’s security apparatus is quite obviously heavily influenced by jihadi ideology, Pakistani bosses may not be deterred by traditional calculations of material self-preservation. Extreme jihadi psychopaths may consider the destruction of Pakistan an acceptable price if it ensures massive damage to India, perceived as a land of ‘infidels.’

It is not merely that deterrence may fail utterly against jihadists; it’s that they may joyfully seek Catastrophe. In such cases, India’s retaliatory capacity, though assured, hardly guarantees stability. Once again, MAD does not apply.

A strategic quandary for India

In pure game-theoretic terms, the above forces a dangerous logic: India’s safest move is to strike first, with the goal of preemptively disabling Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal before it can be used. That’s called a counterforce strike: a strike not on the cities full of civilians, but on Pakistan’s ability to use nuclear weapons. Yet India has not done so—restrained, it would seem, by its own ethical standards and fears of political and international repercussions.

Indian identity, domestically and internationally, is bound to a self-image as a responsible, ethical democracy. India, after all, produced the most famous ethical prophet of modern times, Mahatma Gandhi, whose moral leadership was based on the concept of ahimsa (nonviolence) and satyagraha (truth-force), both deeply rooted in Hindu, Jain, and to some extent Buddhist traditions—especially from the Bhagavad Gita, the Upanishads, and Jain ethics. This tradition, of course, is diametrically opposed to the core values of jihadism.

A first strike, especially a nuclear one, would devastate the image that Hindus have of themselves and their civilization, and it could provoke domestic unrest.

There is also this: it is improbable that a first strike will achieve total nuclear disarmament given Pakistan’s mobile and hidden nuclear forces. Even a handful of surviving Pakistani warheads could inflict catastrophic damage on Indian cities.

It’s a difficult strategic position for India: rational analysis suggests preemption, but moral and practical constraints would appear to forbid it—leaving India vulnerable to irrational or fragmented Pakistani decision-making.

Cold Start

India’s original military doctrine was the Sundarji doctrine, according to which India would respond with massive conventional—not nuclear—retaliation against Pakistani aggression. But after the Pakistani-supported jihadi terrorist attack on Parliament in 2002, to which India responded with Operation Parakram, India found it could not mobilize quickly: “it took the Army almost two months to fully deploy troops.”²² This naturally created pressure for doctrinal change.

Pakistan claims that India, in response, developed the alleged ‘Cold Start’ Doctrine. India officially denies that any such thing as ‘Cold Start’ exists. But Pakistani strategists use this allegation as a justification for their own nuclear doctrine.

What is this all about?

The basic idea in ‘Cold Start’ is a conventional Indian invasion of Pakistan—but keeping it below the nuclear threshold. The attack will be so shockingly sudden and yet so carefully restrained that the caught-with-its-pants-down Pakistani military will not feel justified in retaliating with nuclear weapons. The problems to solve are the following:

• Rapid mobilization: Indian forces would have to be battle-ready in hours, not weeks.

• Integrated, modular battle groups (IBGs): Highly complex, pre-positioned, self-contained strike units—combining armor, infantry, artillery, and air support—for quick, shallow thrusts.

• Limited territorial objectives: Instead of deep penetration aiming to topple Pakistan’s government, the focus would be on seizing small, strategic areas to punish Pakistan for sponsoring terrorism—without triggering massive escalation.

• Political-strategic signaling: Deliver enough pain to Pakistan to deter future provocations, but not so much that it forces Pakistan into a desperate nuclear response.

If we suppose—for the sake of argument—that Cold Start really is being taken seriously within Indian strategic circles, what does this require Indian planners to believe?

They must believe that a threshold exists in Pakistani psychology below which a conventional Indian attack on Pakistan does not trigger a nuclear Pakistani response, even though:

1. the publicly expressed Pakistani doctrine is to use nuclear weapons against a conventional Indian attack; and even though

2. Pakistan’s military is “increasingly religiously motivated”—that is, increasingly jihadist.²³

Indian strategists must also believe that they can discover precisely where this unlikely narrow threshold is, even though:

3. the Pakistani military is becoming “less and less professional, and … has consistently produced rogue officers and staged coups against its own leaders;”²⁴ and even though

4. Pakistani strategy is to have “tactical [nuclear] weapons … devolved to several lower-ranking officers at the battlefield level[, which makes] … command and control of these lethal weapons … much looser.”²⁵

Indian strategists must believe, moreover, that they can execute the most exquisitely complex and delicate conventional military performance, keeping the fight within that narrow, imagined threshold.

Finally, it means that Indian strategists are willing to accept the risk that they’ll fumble on some aspect of ‘Cold Start’ and give Pakistan a golden excuse to use nuclear weapons first.

Let me put it this way: If ‘Cold Start’ is what passes for Indian strategic thinking, we are most certainly all doomed. But I don’t think Indian strategists are idiots. According to them, “such a doctrine does not exist but is a term that has been fabricated by think tanks.”²⁶

Indeed, it was Walter C. Ladwig, an academic at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, who first discussed the ‘Cold Start’ idea.²⁷ According to him, the Indian army announced this new doctrine in April 2004. This is the kind of claim that demands a verbatim quotation, in the text, so we can all see precisely what the Indian Army supposedly said. Ladwig quotes nothing. He doesn’t even provide a footnote! Around that time, Firdaus Ahmed at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, another think tank, claimed that the Indian Army had announced ‘Cold Start’ “during the Army Commanders Conference on 28 April 2004.”²⁸ But Ahmed also neither quotes the alleged announcement verbatim, nor does he provide a footnote. You’d think the claim of a major change in India’s strategic orientation—from a defensive to an offensive doctrine—would call for more rigor.

It seems, however, that the claim of ‘Cold Start’ has been useful to Pakistan, for it is Pakistan’s justification for developing tactical nuclear weapons (like the short-range Nasr missile system).

A more reasonable Indian doctrine?

I can certainly agree that the Op Parakram debacle in 2002 must have convinced Indian strategists of the need to improve mobilization speed. And also that they needed a new doctrine. But I suspect the new doctrine is something more reasonable than ‘Cold Start.’

One intriguing possibility is that, while maintaining an official NFU posture, India may have quietly developed flexible doctrines to allow a preemptive counterforce strike—that is, a strike exclusively against Pakistan’s nuclear installations and command & control centers—if an imminent Pakistani nuclear launch is detected. This would be paired with public communication strategies designed to frame such a strike as moral and defensive.

In 2019, in an article titled ‘India’s Counterforce Temptations’ and published in International Security, Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang explored this very possibility. They noted “an increasing number of public statements by serving and retired Indian national security officials arguing that preemptive counterforce options against Pakistan are permissible doctrinally and advantageous strategically.”

This theory explains why “Indian officials have made a persistent and otherwise puzzling argument either that India should revise its NFU policy to permit preemption or that preemptive use upon warning of imminent Pakistani launch is consistent with its existing NFU policy.” As the authors observe, “there may be no explicit acknowledgment or indicators of this shift, which may force Pakistan to adjust its nuclear posture and strategy on the fear that it has already occurred.”²⁹

In this view, although India officially retains NFU, it is now positioning itself—should the circumstances justify it—to conduct a disarming first strike.

The Logic of a 'Moral' Preemptive Strike

Building on this evolution, the most rational strategy may be the following:

1. India attacks, in a first strike, only Pakistan’s nuclear forces, thus sparing cities and civilians;

2. India immediately announces that this strike was solely to prevent imminent Pakistani aggression;

3. India warns that any Pakistani strike on Indian cities will result in total annihilation of Pakistan’s population centers.

By doing this, India might retain the moral high ground while splitting rational actors inside Pakistan from extremist factions, which could avoid, or at least minimize, escalation into total nuclear war.

In other words, India would leverage both strategic force and moral signaling to maximize the chance of de-escalation after a necessary preemptive move. While no such strategy is risk-free—survival still depends on whether rational actors prevail in Pakistan’s crisis response—it significantly improves India’s odds compared to a passive, waiting strategy against a genocidal jihadi opponent that has no plans to give up the fight.

Timing and Opportunity: The Current Crisis

The current crisis may present India with an unusually favorable opportunity to act. The terrorist attack that killed 26 people in Pahalgam, Kashmir has clear links to Pakistan-based groups (specifically The Resistance Front, associated with Lashkar-e-Taiba). In response, India has:

• suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, a key water-sharing agreement;

• closed its airspace to Pakistani aircraft and revoked visas for Pakistani nationals;

• expelled Pakistani diplomats and recalled its own from Islamabad; and

• initiated a crackdown in Kashmir, demolishing homes of suspected militants and detaining thousands.

Pakistan, for its part, has:

• closed its airspace to Indian flights;

• suspended the 1972 Simla Agreement; and

• expelled Indian diplomats and halted trade with India.

Moreover, Pakistan accuses that an Indian attack is imminent and has made public threats of nuclear defense.

Tensions are obviously at a high pitch.

International sympathy for India, especially among Western powers, is stronger than usual—at least where obligatory official statements are concerned. This can be leveraged. India could now credibly claim that Pakistan’s nuclear posture has become unstable and dangerous. Whether or not that’s technically true, the argument would be plausible enough to justify a preemptive counterforce strike under the doctrine of imminent threat. India may never again have such a clear pretext.

Indian bosses may perceive that, if they wait, jihadi Pakistan will continue to build its forces for a future attack that is sure to come.

Risks and Final Considerations

Even with the optimal execution of a counterforce strategy, risks remain high. Here are the main things to worry about:

• Incomplete disarmament: Hidden Pakistani missiles could survive.

• Loss of control: Pakistani command structures could fragment, allowing rogue launches.

• Jihadi escalation: Extremist elements may seek to provoke apocalypse rather than surrender.

• Perception: India must carefully manage international perception, lest it alienate critical allies or provoke sanctions.

Yet the cost of waiting—and risking a Pakistani first strike on Indian cities—may be perceived in India as the greater risk. Thus, India faces a grave strategic choice: act now, under morally and diplomatically justifiable conditions, or continue to rely on the fragile hope that rationality will prevail indefinitely in Pakistan.

Things may get ugly.

Conclusion

The India–Pakistan nuclear balance is dangerously unstable, not because of technological imbalances alone, but because of the ideological fractures inside Pakistan. Traditional MAD assumptions do not fully apply. India’s policymakers have almost certainly evolved their doctrine toward flexible counterforce planning. A logical and morally framed preemptive strike—focused on disabling nuclear forces while protecting civilians—offers a difficult but viable path to survival. Given the current crisis triggered by Pakistani-backed terrorism, the window for such action may have opened. It may not remain open for long. The tragedy is that India, one of the major centers of ethical civilization, finds itself forced to consider actions that could stain its soul—in order to protect its future. Such is the brutal logic of survival when the rationality of your adversary cannot be assumed.

1. Quoted in: Kapur, S. P. (2007). Dangerous deterrent: Nuclear weapons proliferation and conflict in South Asia. Stanford University Press. (p.3)

2. Narang, V. (2014). Nuclear strategy in the modern era: Regional powers and international conflict. Princeton University Press.​ (p.1)

3. ‘Pakistan's Minister Tarar says India may launch military strike within next 24–36 hours’
Reuters, April 29, 2025.
https://www.reuters.com/world/pakistans-minister-tarar-says-india-may-launch-military-strike-within-next-24-36-2025-04-29

4. Kapur, S. P. (2007). Dangerous deterrent: Nuclear weapons proliferation and conflict in South Asia. Stanford University Press. (p.3)

5

• 1947–48 (First Kashmir War)

• 1965 (Second Kashmir War)

• 1971 (Bangladesh War)

• 1999 (Kargil conflict – counted by some as a full war)

6. Kapur, S. P. (2007). Dangerous deterrent: Nuclear weapons proliferation and conflict in South Asia. Stanford University Press. (p.3)

7. Business Standard. (2024, December 21). French magazine exposes Pak’s links to extremist network Jaish-e-Mohammed. Business Standard.
https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence-security/news/french-magazine-exposes-pak-s-links-to-extremist-network-jaish-e-mohammed-124122100310_1.html

8. Reagan, R. (1983, March 21). Message on the observance of Afghanistan Day. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum.
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/message-observance-afghanistan-day

9. Bagchi, I. (2010, June 6). Just 2% of people in J&K want to join Pak: Survey. The Times of India.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/just-2-of-people-in-jk-want-to-join-pak-survey/articleshow/5982710.cms

10. Schelling, T. C. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press.

Schelling, T. C. (1966). Arms and influence. Yale University Press.

11. Kristensen, H. M., & Norris, R. S. (2017). Indian nuclear forces, 2017. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 73(4), 205–209. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1337998
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.1337998

12. ‘Pakistan nuclear weapons, 2023’; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; 11 September 2023; By Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns.
https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-09/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-2023/

13. Gilani, S. N. A. (2024, June 10). Pakistan’s second strike capability. Pakistan Today.
https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2024/06/10/pakistans-second-strike-capability/

14. Menon, S. (2016). Choices: Inside the making of Indian foreign policy. Brookings Institution Press. (ch.5)
https://www.puradsimedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/CHOICES.pdf

15. Quoted in: Menon, S. (2016). Choices: Inside the making of Indian foreign policy. Brookings Institution Press. (ch.5)

16. Kristensen, H. M., & Norris, R. S. (2017). Indian nuclear forces, 2017. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 73(4), 205–209. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1337998
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.1337998

17. Narang, V. (2014). Nuclear strategy in the modern era: Regional powers and international conflict. Princeton University Press.​ (pp.79-80)

18. Fair, C. C. (2014). Fighting to the end: The Pakistan Army’s way of war. Oxford University Press. (ch.1).

19. Fair, C. C. (2014). Fighting to the end: The Pakistan Army’s way of war. Oxford University Press. (ch.4).

20. Fair, C. C. (2014). Fighting to the end: The Pakistan Army’s way of war. Oxford University Press. (ch.4).

21. Business Standard. (2024, December 21). French magazine exposes Pak’s links to extremist network Jaish-e-Mohammed. Business Standard.
https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence-security/news/french-magazine-exposes-pak-s-links-to-extremist-network-jaish-e-mohammed-124122100310_1.html

Excerpt from the article:

“The report highlights the resurgence of the Jaish e Mohammed (JeM), particularly in Bahawalpur area of Punjab province where the group reportedly operates massive complexes such as Markaz Subhan Allah. These facilities, equipped with dormitories, religious education centres, and even solar-powered self-sufficient systems, serve as hubs for terrorists' indoctrination and training.

‘According to satellite photos available on the Planet Labs website, Jaish-e-Mohammed has two centers in the Bahawalpur area: Markaz Subhan Allah and the Usman-o-Ali mosque,’ said the report …

It added that the first is a 60,000-square-meter site. It includes a centre for Quranic studies, a sports hall, dormitories, and around fifty rooms.

‘A nephew of Masood Azhar, Muhammad Ataullah Kashif, is the administrative head of the Markaz. The centre provides extremist religious education as well as physical training to its approximately 600 to 700 internal members. It houses 40 to 50 teachers,’ said the French magazine in its report.

The report underscores JeM's historic connections to Pakistan's intelligence agency, ISI, which allegedly facilitated its activities against India.

‘In the 2000s, a branch of the ISI, the JIN (Joint Intelligence North), was specifically tasked with training and manipulating radical Islamist elements against India. During the Cold War, the ISI adopted the same structure as the Savak, the internal intelligence service of the Shah of Iran. It also received assistance from the CIA and the SDECE, the predecessor of France's DGSE,’ said the report.

It added, ‘In the same spirit, the security of the complex has been strengthened; satellite images show the construction of new guard posts. Solar panels can also be seen, enabling the centre to be completely self-sufficient.’

Former Pakistani officials, including ex-President Pervez Musharraf, have admitted to supporting JeM during their tenures. Such revelations underscore systemic ties between Pakistan's state apparatus and extremist networks.”

22. Indian Express. (2010, February 21). No Cold Start doctrine, India tells US. The Indian Express.
https://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/web/no-cold-start-doctrine-india-tells-us/

23. Menon, S. (2016). Choices: Inside the making of Indian foreign policy. Brookings Institution Press. (ch.5)

24. Menon, S. (2016). Choices: Inside the making of Indian foreign policy. Brookings Institution Press. (ch.5)

25. Menon, S. (2016). Choices: Inside the making of Indian foreign policy. Brookings Institution Press. (ch.5)

26. Indian Express. (2010, February 21). No Cold Start doctrine, India tells US. The Indian Express.
https://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/web/no-cold-start-doctrine-india-tells-us/

27. Ladwig, W. C. (2004). A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.

28. ‘The Day After ‘Cold Start’ ’; Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies; 23 November 2007; by Firdaus Ahmed

29. Clary, C., & Narang, V. (2018). India's counterforce temptations: Strategic dilemmas, doctrine, and capabilities. International Security, 43(3), 7-52.
https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/43/3/7/1844191/isec_a_00340.pdf