How to do scientific conspiracy theory
A proposal for programmatic research
In principle, the patterns of politics and geopolitics may be more consistent either with:
diffusely emergent and ‘chaotic’ processes; or
centralized clandestine management.
We must not prejudge the issue.
But of course, we have prejudged it. Our meaning-making systems—media and academia—have insisted for decades that, with any and all system-wide Machiavellian hypotheses (‘conspiracy theories’), we should prejudicially dismiss rather than investigate because all such hypotheses are supposedly crazy, ridiculous, and wrong.
This taboo has become an integral feature of the culture of university-educated Westerners, where the knee-jerk—at once effortless and ‘knowing’—dismissal of Machiavellian hypotheses is considered good form and keeps a university-educated person—a card-carrying member of ‘polite society’—in good standing with the tribe. To challenge this taboo is to risk rejection, even ostracism. By thus frightening all social scientists away from any serious consideration of Machiavellian hypotheses, this taboo turns the disciplines that purport to analyze politics into well-camouflaged pseudosciences.
I explain this culture and the damage it does to social science here:
Now, because conspiracy theory is taboo in ‘polite society,’ nobody has to justify the dismissal of a system-wide Machiavellian hypothesis. But whenever a justification is provided, it is usually this: the system is too ‘complex’ for centralized clandestine management of that sort. And for this argument, the sexy/trendy topic of ‘complexity theory’ is trotted out as theoretical support. According to this view, large-scale or system-wide Machiavellian hypotheses have no chance of being correct because historical processes—by the very complex nature of social reality—are always chaotically emergent: they can’t be centrally managed.
I believe this view depends entirely on adopting the famous butterfly-effect heuristic as a guiding metaphor. But though this metaphor may be useful to understand lots of natural processes, it is the wrong heuristic, I believe, to help us understand our modern political world, as I argue here:
I rush to concede that, under any scenario, some processes, at some level of organization, have to be diffusely emergent. The question is whether an interesting (worrisome) level of centralized clandestine management is taking place at a broad level, or whether Western societies are mostly free.
At least for historical processes since 1848, I believe we have strong evidence of centralized clandestine management by very powerful actors who wish to derail the historical processes taking us toward less imperfect democracies. If you’d like to know why I consider the year 1848—the great Year of Revolution that spawned the modern Western world—the key pivot, I have explained my views here:
Now, as I have argued, we need to plunge joyfully into this forbidden activity, conspiracy theory, if we want to understand our sociopolitical reality and remain free. But joyfully does not mean lightly or superficially. I am not endorsing that we treat this as a form of entertainment, which it seems to be for many with a taste for ‘outrageous’ claims about those who run the world.
No, we must apply ourselves with special rigor precisely because we must contend with a hostile university and media culture. Our citizen science must adapt and strive harder to do good work, and we must learn new ways to communicate effectively and help others overcome their prejudices. There can be no special pleading about things we think are obvious, because they simply won’t be obvious to those afflicted by the taboo, and because we can’t be sure whether something apparently ‘obvious’ is really true until we investigate it carefully. Everything we claim requires a careful—scientific—demonstration.
My purpose here is to offer some guidelines to help us do better.
The test is meaning
The test is whether a proposed Machiavellian model makes the recent accumulated historical evidence of State (and other dominant institutional) behaviors more intelligibly meaningful than the cultural baseline of chaotic-emergence models presently preferred by well-behaved professors everywhere in the West.
To support a Machiavellian hypothesis, then, we must seek to show that what are puzzling or downright absurd behaviors under models of emergence instead shine with meaning when the proper Syndicate-based model is invoked, and without introducing new and unsolvable complications elsewhere with respect to the body of evidence.
Elements of a scientific Machiavellian model
To be complete, a Syndicate-invoking model must address, with careful documentation and solid theory, all of the following:
A.   MEMBERSHIP. Who are They? A list of the main players.
B.   STRUCTURE. How do these main players functionally articulate into various roles? The functional ‘shape’ of the organization.
C.   MOTIVATORS. What is meaningful to Them? A catalog of their values and ideals.
D.   GOALS. What are They hoping to achieve? Short-term aims and long-term ambitions.
E.   ASSETS. What do They control? The special tools of power they wield in pursuit of chosen strategies.
F.    STRATEGIES. How do They corrupt institutions and how do They use them to achieve their aims? Preferred methods for pursing their goals.
G.  CONSTRAINTS. What barriers exist to Their freedom of action and maneuver? Factors that limit and therefore help shape the chosen strategies, forcing the Syndicate either to
a.    use a subterfuge or roundabout to try and achieve their aims; or else to
b.    momentarily accept a less than ideal state of affairs while they work to remove or undermine a given constraint.
H. NARRATIVES. What specific stories about the world are They selling us? The manner in which they manage reality for us, making us react to a world that does not, in fact, exist, so that, duped about reality, we will act on the basis of what we assume is true and also moral, innocently handing the advantage to the Machiavellian manipulators.
Making predictions
Qualitative predictions about the broad shape of future evidence discoveries are implicit in any hypothesized model and may be squeezed from it and made explicit. When some of these predictions fail (as some inevitably will), the model must be modified to make it consistent again with the evidence.
But one may not decrease meaning.
That is, one may not pretend to ‘save’ a given model from failed predictions by adding absurd assumptions. We must only admit reasonable modifications, identified by
their evidentiary support;
their easy logical articulation with other assumptions in the model; and
the fresh and successful predictions they generate
Such modifications make the model evolve to become more meaningful, and moving in this direction is always the goal. But if no such movement appears possible, then a different model entirely may have to be considered.
The above may seem like a wordy insistence that conspiracy theory must be science. But confusion now abounds over how science ought to work, so this must be said. And it must be emphasized that explaining the evidence is more important than staying ‘reasonable’ with inherited prejudices, wishful thinking, or the claims of some culturally or institutionally sanctioned ‘authority.’
The manner in which evidence is gathered, presented, and interpreted must of course be a matter of competitive dispute so that errors may be found and expunged with the best available rigor. But aside from that, which is relatively obvious, I recommend a theory-driven search for what I call dramatic facts.
Dramatic facts
A dramatic fact is one that, under the model you are considering, is simply impossible. The documentation of one such fact (and you only need one) would then refute—or ‘falsify’—the model. Thus, consider the following model of the media:
The major mainstream media are independent and autonomous providers of information, competing with each other in a free news market without centralized corruption.
Anyone wishing to argue that only a Syndicate-invoking model can explain the evidence of media behavior should try to document a dramatic fact that defeats the hypothesis of a free news market, as only dramatic facts have any chance of convincing the skeptics for whom conspiracy theory is a moral taboo.
What might such a dramatic fact look like?
If, for example, we could document that the major media, all together, have been lying—that is, knowingly, consciously, and deliberately deceiving us, with malice aforethought—about something of great importance, and that they’ve been doing this for decades, that’s a dramatic fact. Because this sort of thing cannot be done without centralized corruption and centralized management; it is simply impossible in a free news market—even one that is merely moderately competitive. I have analyzed one such dramatic fact, consistent with the hypothesis that the Western media were thoroughly corrupted and disciplined by a centralized power as early as 1938:
The beauty of finding a dramatic fact is that you don’t have to keep arguing the case with new data. You are done. And yet, I do have multiple such demonstrations; here is another:
And guess what? Yet another:
Each one of these demonstrations is sufficient all by itself. But I will be publishing yet more demonstrations of clandestine media control. On this particular issue, I think you all need some overkill.
Generally, my method is to investigate and expose key dramatic facts, with a view to building an articulated model of Western institutions that answers points A through H above. I also do—when possible (which it isn’t, always)—systemic action research, but I will explain that method in a forthcoming piece.
I hope that other researchers will challenge my model and seek to defeat it, helping us find errors so that we may improve it; or else perhaps they’ll help us to discard the entire model in favor of some alternative. It is even possible—it must be contemplated—that we will discard all Machiavellian models in favor an emergence model, as the university-educated would prefer.
So long as it results from a rigorous investigative process, any outcome will be progress.
